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The Promise of American History in Law
GORDON MORRIS BAKKEN*
Professor Wiecek's optimistic view that America's history can
be known and that it has an integrity that must be respected by
the bench and bar requires both a great degree of notice and a
healthy degree of skepticism. The notice comes from the fact that
social scientists and those in the legal profession know that his
conclusions are on point. The healthy degree of skepticism comes
from the same constituencies knowing the origins of the history
that courts use in making decisions. First, history is the product of
historians out of whom a relatively small number of professional
historians put most of the words that we call history into print.
They refine these words in the mills and retorts of the profession:
the professional conferences, the exchange of drafts, the outside
readers, the book reviews, and the historiographical essay. Second,
lawyers create history to suit the needs of their client's cases.
They use expert witnesses who have come to call themselves pub-
lic historians or they assign an associate to visit the library. Third,
judges create history from their memory, their library, or their
clerk's visit to the library.
The question that is not completely answered by Professor
Wiecek is where did the justices get their history? We do know
that some was of personal memory, some was created in the jus-
tice's mind, and some like Brown v. Board of Education (Brown
II), was offered by professional historians. What seems to be miss-
ing is an analysis of the second kind of history, the "law office"
history that is cooked up by associates from inclusions in briefs or
offered at trial by expert witnesses. How much and what kind of
history offered at trial filters its way to our highest court and is it
of any merit from the profession's point of view?
One aspect of the use of history in appellate courts that also
deserves attention is the role of history in general education and in
the education of lawyers. As Alfred Kelley quite correctly pointed
out, the 19th century had a deep and abiding faith in liberal edu-
cation. Theodore Sedgwick's observation that statutory and consti-
tutional construction could be had wholly independent of the rules
of construction from an almost unconscious process derived from
the complete education of the mind was the faith of the early
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ninteenth century. Learned Hand recognized a similar importance
for the judge of the twentieth century. Classical learning had a
significant role in the legal mind. But this was a twentieth century
statement of an eighteenth century faith that slowly died in the
nineteenth century.
The eighteenth century bar was a "company of men of letters"
schooled in general learning, not case law, statutes, and treatises.1
In the generation of lawyers and judges from Hamilton to Web-
ster, general learning and rhetorical ability rather than technical
expertise distinguished the lawyer from the other professions. On
May 10, 1819 John Quincy Adams wrote in his diary that "to live
without having a Cicero and a Tacitus at hand seems to me as if
it was a privation of one of my limbs."2 (In eighteen years of
teaching pre-law students at the university level, I have yet to
hear such a confession.) The rhetorical abilities of lawyers like
Daniel Webster were legendary to the extent that they could over-
come legal technicalities and send a man to the gallows. In 1830
Webster made an eight hour summation to a jury describing a
bloody crime in detail and reminding the jurors that "though he
take the wings of the morning and fly to the uttermost part of the
seas, human murder to human vision will be known. A thousand
eyes, a thousand ears are marking and listening, and thousand of
excited beings are watching his bloodstained step."3 The jury like
Webster saw those steps leading to hemp despite substantial tech-
nical error. But in 1830 "moral justice was done."' 4 The ninteenth
century attorney was a true gentleman of the bar, learned in let-
ters, defending cultural ideals.5
This eighteenth century ideal living in the ninteenth century
mind died hard. David Dudley Field railed against the "mere
practicing lawyer" of the late ninteenth century and saw the ideal
lawyer as a scholar: "He must have comprehended the greatness
of the whole, the harmony of its parts, and the infinite diversity of
its particulars," he wrote.6 But legal education had shifted from
letters to law schools and legal learning had shifted from the
grand philosophy to legal positivism. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
told his generation that they had to forget the traditional "rag-bag
full of general principles" in which abstractions emerged "like a
swarm of little bodiless cherubs fluttering at the top" of a six-
1. R. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETrERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 66-72 (1984).
2. Id. at 73.
3. M. BAXTER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE: DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE UNION 160-61
(1984).
4. Id. at 161.
5. R. FERGUSON, supra note 1, at 69.
6. Id. at 285.
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teenth century painting. Rather the whole legal system had to be
restated with a microscopic intensity that would complement
panoramic scope and reveal the "precise contours" and "inner-
most meanings" of each doctrine.' New generations of lawyers be-
gan their training using this new closer vision until legal realism
became fashionable. Then as the 1946 Yale Curriculum Commit-
tee announced, a new credo needed emphasis: "We take it to be
self-evident that the law is one of the social studies, and that the
study of law will be most fruitful and critical when the skills and
perspective of history, economics, statistics, psychology, political
science, sociology and psychiatry are fully and effectively used in
the work of law schools." 8 Today we have trained social scientists
on law school faculties and a diversity of social science courses in
the curriculum of some of our nation's law schools. But who lis-
tens on the appellate bench?
The ninteenth century justice was conditioned to listen to the
voice of history. It was part of learning and part of the faith of the
times. Joseph Story more than any other figure of the century em-
bodied this faith as a scholar and as a justice of the United States
Supreme Court. Story's Commentaries on the Constitution,
started in 1829 and completed in 1833, provided generations of
lawyers with a section by section, clause by clause analysis of the
Constitution and constitutional materials. In a real sense constitu-
tional history became constitutional law, for again it was the deci-
sions of the Court that became the foundation of interpretation.'
With the reception of these volumes by the profession and in the
society, the lawyers' monopoly of American constitutional law and
the constitutional history announced by that Court began.
In the twentieth century the uses of history by the United
States Supreme Court as well as the nature of history was ques-
tioned. The rise of functionalism in social science caused basic
changes in the discipline of history as well as in law. Functional-
ism in social science was likely to be nonautonmous, empirical,
objective, relativistic, and presentist. 10 In history the generation
that followed Charles Beard attempted to be both particularistic
and empirical, objective yet relativistic. In law, the realists
emerged from the more general intellectual movement. The real-
ists preached that law should be studied as part of society; they
concentrated their attention on facts rather than concepts; they
7. Id. at 288.
8. L. KALMAN. LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 150 (1986).
9. R. NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC 192 (1985).
10. R. KALMAN, supra note 8, at 36.
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spent their time studying law's operations and showing that judges
made law rather than formulating ethical legal rules or arguing
that a higher law guided judges that believed in objectivity and
sometimes in reform as well; and they all sought to make the sub-
ject of their work relevant to contemporary practitioners. 1
This realist perspective is important to the subject because this
school of thought viewed history much differently. One of its lead-
ing proponents, Walton Hamilton, thought that history used by
courts provided a key to an analysis of judicial ingenuousness in
the fields of public and private law. To Walton, history was a
smoke screen of respect cloaked in a murky past. Charles E. Clark
and Thurman Arnold saw history in judicial opinions as evidence
of excessive deference to the past in a present so distant from the
past that the past became irrelevant. For them, history was use-
less.'2 The impact of this criticism was substantial. In the late
1920s and 1930s, constitutional scholars were "unable to see that
the idea of a government of laws and not of men had ever worked
in America." As a result, "[t]hey ceased to define the constitution
as a legal code the main purpose of which was to limit governmen-
tal action. The word 'constitutional' lost its normative content and
became merely descriptive: . . ."13 Even more certainly, as John
Phillip Reid has written, the "propagandists for governmental be-
neficence have removed us from the legal mentality of the nine-
teenth century." Today the word "right" is easily applied to solve
difficulties they thought of as private and now people can persuade
themselves they are "entitled" to what once they would have said
they did "not own.' 14
If history is irrelevant in a presentist, relativistic legal world in
which words of the ninteenth century no longer have normative
content, what hope should we have for history in law? Professor
James Boyd White proposes some directions in a chapter entitled
"Constituting a Culture of Argument: The Possibilities of Ameri-
can Law."'15 In the life of the law, White argues, is an important
place for argument with the lawyer playing the critical role speak-
ing for the culture. "The law is less a branch of the social sciences
than of the humanities in that it seeks not to be a closed system
but an open one. It learns from the past and seeks new terms for
the expression of motives, new forms for the establishment of rela-
11. Id. at 285.
12. Id. at 288.
13. Id. at 39.
14. J. REID. LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON THE
OVERLAND TRAIL 293 (1980).
15. J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECON-
STITUTION OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY 231-74 (1984).
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tions; it is a method of learning and teaching; and its central con-
cern is with the kind of relations that we establish with our inher-
ited culture and with each other when we speak its language."1
White found the promise of this argument being worked out in
"our early law," in the period of John Marshall and Joseph Story,
in the period of general learning and rhetorical flare.
Is that part of our culture of law gone or can history in law help
to constitute a public law faithful to our dynamic culture? Can
we, as Paul Murphy suggested, feed "good history to the Judges?"
Professor Wiecek's example of Justice Hugo Black's rejection of
Leonard Levy's conclusions and sending a law clerk off to disprove
them to no avail is perhaps instructive. Although that clerk
searched diligently for historical evidence to the contrary, he was
unable to defeat Levy for Black. The Justice did not like the an-
swer of history. It did not fit his predisposition. Of course, as Pro-
fessor Wiecek points out in a footnote, Levy revised Levy. In
1985, Levy wrote "I was wrong in asserting that the American
experience with freedom of political expression was as slight as
the conceptual and legal understanding was narrow." Further, he
acknowledged that the Supreme Court was right in Grosjean v.
American Press Co. (1936). The book Legacy of Suppression
(1960) that grew out of "an opportunity.., to write for money"
and after years of subsequent research became The Emergence of
a Free Press (1985). 17 Good history must look, as Levy asserts,
beyond law and theory to practice in the social setting of the
times. Perhaps Black's law clerk did not know enough of historical
research methods to find what Levy later found after the original
reasons for the publication of the book had long since past.
Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, cited by Professor Wiecek
in his discussion, of Swift deserves some amplification in the con-
text of history and language. Jensen was a companion case to
three cases questioning the constitutionality of state worker com-
pensation statutes. 8 The Supreme Court upheld the state statutes,
but in Jensen, the Court, 5-4, declared unconstitutional the appli-
cation of the New York statute to longshoremen. The majority
found that a stevedore, injured while on shipboard while perform-
ing maritime work under a maritime contract was within admi-
ralty jurisdiction; that the admiralty clause of the Constitution
granting jurisdiction to the federal courts required a uniform na-
16. id. at 273.
17. L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS vii-xi (1985).
18. 244 U.S. 205 (1917); The other cases were New York Central R.R. Co. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Mountain Timber
Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
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tional law; that only Congress could modify maritime law and it
had not done so; that the "saving to suitors" clause applied only to
common law remedies; that a scheme of workers compensation
was wholly unknown to the common law; and that the compensa-
tion remedy was inconsistent with congressional policy as declared
in the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. The central proposition
of the majority that national uniformity was constitutionally re-
quired was attacked by the dissenters as having no precedent.
Holmes attacked the proposition that maritime law was a corpus
juris. He also maintained that state law, not admiralty law, pre-
vailed in state court cases involving maritime questions.
Although the interplay of state and federal jurisdictions over
maritime matters was longstanding,"9 neither the majority nor the
minority wasted substantial ink on the subject. Rather, language
would resolve the situation. Congress acted to remedy the wrong
by statute, but the Court found the tinkering constitutionally de-
fective. 20 The Congress tried another statutory tack, but against
the gale of majority opinion it could not prevail. 21 Finally, the mi-
nority that wanted to avoid the common law of employers and
common law remedies found a way that the majority would ac-
cept: language. In 1926, the Court found that a longshoreman
stowing cargo who had been injured by the negligence of a fellow
servant was covered by the Jones Act because a longshoreman was
a seaman. Holmes wrote for a unanimous court that "it is true
that for most purposes, as the word is commonly used, stevedores
are not 'seaman'. But words are flexible."'22 Words worked in the
Court perhaps because Congress had failed to amend the Jones
Act to include longshoremen. But Congress did respond immedi-
ately to pass a Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, perhaps to restore the meaning of language or the con-
tinuity of maritime legal history.
With this skeptical view of history in law and words fading
from their historical context, where is the future for history in
law. First, litigation will continue to create a demand for history
in law. The Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 created a
need for historian experts on subject matter ranging from the
value of land at the time of a treaty to ancient fishing practices. 23
The work on litigation has, in turn, generated a new historical
19. Bakken, Admiralty Law in Nineteenth Century California, 58 S. CAL Q. 499-
514 (1976).
20. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
21. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
22. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
23. 2 F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE
AMERICAN INDIANS 1017-21, 1171-90 (1984).
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literature, books done for lawyers for litigation or the historical
work of experts converted into historical monographs.24 Second,
judges will continue to send their clerks to libraries to find the
history they want to create. Third, the growing interest in Ameri-
can legal and consitutional history within the profession of history
and in law schools will generate an increasingly sophisticated liter-
ature. Hopefully, it will be from this third source that lawyers and
judges will look to when pondering the import of history in law.
Fourth, the debate on the original intent of the Founding Fathers
will continue to produce all sorts of history.
The fact that we are in a bicentennial year and had the nomina-
tion of Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court before
us, provided a rich popular literature on history in law. The popu-
lar literature centered upon Attorney General Meese's call for the
Court to adhere to the original intent of the Founding Fathers in
consitutional interpretation, Judge Bork's writings and testimony
on original intent interpretation, and the chorus of opposing views.
The public has been treated to more history in law than it proba-
bly can digest. The Los Angeles Times told its readers on August
16, 1987 that Judge Bork's "view of the Constitution's 'original
intent' [was] at [the] heart of [the] controversy. '2 5 The article
characterized Bork's position as requiring courts to focus on each
specific provision of the Constitution rather than upon generalized
values and not to create rights not contemplated by the Founding
Fathers. The creation of such new rights as well as the regulation
of certain areas of behavior such as abortion and homosexuality
belonged to the legislative branch of government, particularly the
state legislatures. The story counterpoised that position with Stan-
ford historian Jack Racove's, who debated James Madison's view
of original intent with the judge finding exactly the opposite con-
stitutional vision. Justice William Brennan, Jr. took a similar view
from the Supreme Court bench in 1985, arguing that Bork's view
that the Court could not stray beyond those individual rights ex-
plicitly contemplated by the Founders was wrong. "This is a
choice no less political than any other. It expresses antipathy of
claims of minority rights against the majority," Brennan said.
The public also has been treated to a debate over the meaning
of the ninth amendment. Because of Bork's references to that
amendment and Harvard Law Professor Laurence H. Tribe's tes-
24. The claims to water have generated several books. For example, see C. DUMARS,
M. O'LEARY, AND A. UTTON, PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS: STRUGGLE FOR A PRECIOUS
RESOURCE (1984); M. MEYERS, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LE-
GAL HISTORY 1550-1850 (1984). On fishing rights see F. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE
CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS (1986).
25. L.A. Times, August 16, 1987.
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timony on Bork's views, the letters to the editor column of The
Wall Street Journal contained more than the usual. Tribe wrote
the editor on October 5, 1987 that "the real dispute is between
Judge Bork and those who read the word 'liberty' as extending
beyond the specific liberties that the Framers enumerated. My
point is that, on this basic issue, Judge Bork is very much the odd-
man-out." Tribe continued assailing Bork's view of the ninth
amendment "as a mere 'inkblot' on the Constitution."2 A Journal
editorial of that date received another letter from Tribe two days
later. Tribe lashed back that he did not have a pet project of using
the ninth amendment as carte blanche for judges to create
whatever new constitutional rights [that] fit their fancy." That
was wrong, Tribe pointed out, because "the ninth amendment's
recognition of unenumerated rights is hardly a pet project of
mine; if anything, it was James Madison's 'pet project.'" "The
Constitution's history," Tribe continued, "as Judge Bork recog-
nized in a 1968 article he wrote as Professor Bork, makes it clear
that James Madison introduced the ninth amendment precisely to
prevent the enumeration of specific rights in a Bill of Rights from
being construed to defeat or belittle rights excluded from the enu-
meration." 27 Both Tribe and Bork seemed to be creating some his-
tory on Madison's original intent.28 Tribe did not reach the ques-
tion in his reply to the editor of whether it properly belonged to
the states or the federal government or their respective appellate
courts to create these rights.
What all of this public history-making may imply is that history
for law professors is very much the same stuff it is for lawyers and
judges. David A.J. Richards, however, has suggested that history
may have a role larger than window dressing for mannequins of
current liberal consitutional demands. Drawing upon the work of
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, Richards points out that
"rights-based and right-sensitive theories" of jurisprudence force
lawyers and judges "to take account ...of the historically in-
tended premises of constitutionalism. ' ' 29 The federal bench has
produced equally but opposite ink. Irving R. Kaufman, Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge for the second circuit has stated that " I
regard reliance on original intent-a technique whose popularity
26. Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1987.
27. Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1987.
28. For another form of current history on Madison see James Madison and the
Constitution, 30 PAC. HISTORIAN 5-17 (1986).
29. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 14 (1986). For a discussion
of some of the literature on original intent and constitutional policy see Bakken, California
Constitutionalism: Politics, the Press and the Death of Fundamental Law, 30 PAC. HISTO-
RIAN 5-17 (1986).
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has recently surged-to be a largely specious mode of interpreta-
tion."30 Associate Justice William Brennan's conception of the
"role of original intent in constitution interpretation repudiates
history.""' He stated in 1985 that "the genius of the Constitution
rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that
is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to
cope with current problems and current needs." The
"[c]onstitutional fundamentals" of the Founders cannot be the
"fundamentals" of today, according to Brennan.32
New York University Law Professor John Phillip Reid has eval-
uated the debate in broader terms than history in law. "The es-
sence of original-intent jurisprudence," Reid argued, "is not a re-
spect for constitutional meaning discovered through the discipline
of history. It is better seen as a rejection in the name of elective
democracy of unbridled judicial activism. 33 Reid concluded that
most lawyers would embrace the doctrine of the positivism of his-
tory and the theory of the neutrality of historical construction, but
reminded his audience that historians would ask whose intention?
Where do you find it? How can it be called objective? 34
Leonard Levy, speaking as an historian, told The Wall Street
Journal that advocates of original intent "know very little about
history."35 Levy, like Wiecek, deplores the uses of history by the
Supreme Court leading to disastrous ends.
Perhaps Professor Wiecek's work, the debate over original in-
tent, and the bicentennial celebration will generate that good his-
tory. Professor Reid's monumental Constitutional History of the
American Revolution first two volumes are now in print from the
University of Wisconsin Press.36 The first volume, subtitled "the
authority of rights," should be required reading for all who have
an interest in our Constitution. But the interest in our Constitu-
tion is part of our culture and will continue to flourish far beyond
1991. As University of Wisconsin Law Professor Gordon B. Bald-
win has written "at the first sound of a new argument over the
United States Constitution and its interpretation, the hearts of
Americans leap with a fearful joy. The blood stirs powerfully in
their veins and a new lustre brightens their eyes. Like King
30. John Philip Reid, Originalism and Subjectivism in the Bicentennial Year, Spring
1987, typescript, p.3.
31. Id. at 16-17.
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 24.
34. Id. at 25.
35. Wermiel, Meaning of First Amendment Clauses on Religion Sparks Emotional
Debate, Few Clear Answers, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1987.
36. J. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986).
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Harry's men before Harfleur, they stand like greyhounds in the
slips, straining upon the start. ' 37 I can only hope that the history
that is generated is of the high quality exhibited by Professors
Wiecek and Reid, and that the legal community will choose that
history and reject the "concocted history" of our judicial past.
37. Baldwin, The Constitution: The Virtues of its Vices, and Vice Versa, 88 Wis.
ALUMNUS No. 5, p. 8 (1987).
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